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E-mail address: pmork@mitre.org (P. Mork).We examine how the biomedical informatics (BMI) community, especially consortia that share data and
applications, can take advantage of a new resource called ‘‘cloud computing”. Clouds generally offer
resources on demand. In most clouds, charges are pay per use, based on large farms of inexpensive, ded-
icated servers, sometimes supporting parallel computing. Substantial economies of scale potentially yield
costs much lower than dedicated laboratory systems or even institutional data centers. Overall, even with
conservative assumptions, for applications that are not I/O intensive and do not demand a fully mature
environment, the numbers suggested that clouds can sometimes provide major improvements, and
should be seriously considered for BMI. Methodologically, it was very advantageous to formulate analy-
ses in terms of component technologies; focusing on these speciﬁcs enabled us to bypass the cacophony
of alternative deﬁnitions (e.g., exactly what does a cloud include) and to analyze alternatives that employ
some of the component technologies (e.g., an institution’s data center). Relative analyses were another
great simpliﬁer. Rather than listing the absolute strengths and weaknesses of cloud-based systems
(e.g., for security or data preservation), we focus on the changes from a particular starting point, e.g., indi-
vidual lab systems. We often ﬁnd a rough parity (in principle), but one needs to examine individual acqui-
sitions—is a loosely managed lab moving to a well managed cloud, or a tightly managed hospital data
center moving to a poorly safeguarded cloud?
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
‘‘Cloud” computing has been receiving much attention as an
alternative to both specialized grids and to owning and managing
one’s own servers. Currently available articles, blogs, and forums
focus on applying clouds to industries outside of biomedical infor-
matics. In this article, we describe the fundamentals of cloud com-
puting and illustrate how one might evaluate a particular cloud for
biomedical purposes.
Typically, laboratories purchase local servers for computation-
or data-intensive tasks that cannot be performed on desktop ma-
chines. Locally-hosted machines are also increasingly used to share
data and applications in collaborative research, e.g., in the Biomed-
ical Informatics Research Network (BIRN) and Cancer Biomedical
Informatics Grid (caBIG), both funded by the National Institutes
of Health (NIH).
Meanwhile, image analysis, data mining, protein folding, and
gene sequencing are all important tools for biomedical researchers.
These resource-intensive shared applications often involve large
data sets, catalogs, and archives, under multiple owners, often withll rights reserved.
ation, Innovative Information
S H317 McLean, VA 22103-bursty workloads. In response, biomedical consortia (often involv-
ing multiple institutions) have implemented their applications on
top of laboratory-hosted servers in a distributed grid architecture,
as described in Section 2. To sustain such servers, laboratories and
their institutions require space, cooling, power, low-level system
administration, and negotiations (e.g., about software standards
and ﬁrewalls between institutions). The consequent dollars and
delays are often ignored in purchase decisions, but can be very
substantial.
Clouds shift the responsibility to install and maintain hardware
and basic computational services away from the customer (e.g., a
laboratory or consortium) to the cloud vendor. Higher levels of
the application stack and administration of sharing remain intact,
and remain the customer’s responsibility.
For consumers, cloud computing is primarily a new business
paradigm, as opposed to a new technical paradigm; a cloud vendor
(a commercial company) provides hardware, a software infrastruc-
ture (platform), or an application as a service to its customers. In
the simplest scenario, a cloud vendor allows its customers to gain
the capabilities of a simple server—albeit a virtual one—in which
the processing, network, and storage resources are controlled
dynamically. More sophisticated clouds also provide useful data-
sets (e.g., genomic or census data), management capabilities, pro-
gramming environments (e.g., .Net in Microsoft Azure), web
service platforms (e.g., Google App Engine), or access to particular
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processing power and storage, often in minutes, merely by sending
a service request to the cloud vendor. The server (or storage, or
communication channel) is ‘‘virtual” in the sense that the vendor
provides capacity as needed—e.g., a server, or slice of a server, from
its pool of machines.
The goal of this paper is to help decision makers at biomedical
laboratories, funding agencies, and especially consortia to under-
stand where cloud computing may be appropriate and to describe
how to assess a particular cloud. We focus on labs that need to
share information with outsiders, such as consortia investiga-
tors—the rapidly-growing cloud literature sufﬁces to guide labs
that simply wish to acquire cheaper compute resources.
Two aspects of our analysis bear mentioning. First, we steer
around the un-resolvable debate about where to draw the bound-
ary between ‘‘cloud” and ‘‘not a cloud” (or ‘‘grid” and ‘‘not a grid”).
Authors have different concerns, and will persist in drawing differ-
ent boundaries. Also, deﬁnitions involve a list of inclusions and
exclusions, which a reader is unlikely to recall. So we present a fea-
ture list, rather than absolutely requiring or forbidding features.
Technical analyses refer to systems having or lacking a particular
feature, regardless of whether that system is categorized as a
cloud, institutional data center, or consortium grid. The features
are useful as information retrieval keywords—we call a system a
cloud if it has a preponderance of the features that authors empha-
size in systems they call clouds. Second, we clarify discussions of
both costs and security by employing a relative approach. That is,
rather than list pros and cons of clouds in isolation, we consider
‘‘before” and ‘‘after”. By identifying issues that are not substantially
changed, we greatly reduce the scope of comparison.
In Section 2 we present background information on grids and
clouds. Section 3 provides an overview of consortium computing.
Section 4 discusses cloud infrastructure for medical consortia and
describes sample cloud vendors. The next two sections contain the
central evaluations. Section 5 evaluates several different tradeoffs,
and Section 6 discusses cloud security, a major concern of many po-
tential adopters. Section 7 identiﬁes properties that make a project
amenable (or not) to cloud computing, and Section 8 presents
conclusions.2. Background
Powerful instruments, satellites, and sensor networks can easily
generate terabytes to petabytes of scientiﬁc data in a day [2]. As bio-
medical research transitions to a data-centric paradigm, scientists
need to work more collaboratively, crossing geographic, domain,
and social barriers. Interdisciplinary collaboration over the Internet
is in demand, making it necessary for individual laboratories to
equip themselves with the technical infrastructure needed for
informationmanagement and data sharing. For example, a research
groupmay need to include data from clinical records, genome stud-
ies, animal studies, and toxicology analyses. The era of spreadsheet-
based research data storage is approaching its limits [3].2.1. Distributed system architectures
Grids, virtualized data centers, and clouds constitute three ap-
proaches to sharing computer resources and data to facilitate col-
laboration. These architectures overlap in their implementation
techniques and in the features they offer to biomedical consortia.
Furthermore, systems of each category adopt good ideas from the
others, and tradeoffs often depend on the presence of that feature,
not on the overall categorization. We summarize these architec-
tures brieﬂy here and express detailed comparisons in terms of
individual features.Grid technology is popular in the scientiﬁc community. Grid
participants typically share computational resources running on
independently-managed machines, using standard networking
protocols. Grid toolkits often provide management and security
capabilities. When running computationally-intensive jobs, one
frequently receives an entire machine, or several.
Data center virtualization products typically assume a dedi-
cated pool of machines that are used to support a variety of tasks.
They have become quite successful in commercial and govern-
ment data centers. While one may occasionally allocate a whole
machine (or cluster) to a single, computationally-expensive task,
more often these products allow multiple virtual processors, stor-
age systems, and networks to be supported over the same set of
underlying hardware. Virtual machines can be quickly activated
or deactivated. If each virtual machine is lightly utilized, one
can consolidate many virtual machines onto the same physical
hardware, thus improving utilization and cost. To compete with
open source products (such as Xen), leading vendors (such as
VMware) now include higher-level services, such as conﬁguration
management, workload orchestration, policy-based allocation,
and accounting.
Cloud computing is a highly touted recent phenomenon. As
noted, there is little hope of obtaining consensus or a standard def-
inition regarding exactly what constitutes a ‘‘cloud” (and the term
‘‘grid” has been similarly overloaded). For example, [4] emphasizes
quality of service contracts for a cloud, [5] contrasts social issues
with technical infrastructure, while others focus on price or on
the nature of the resources provided (e.g., storage, processors, plat-
forms, or application services). Some writers emphasize what the
cloud provides to its consumers, e.g., services on demand. Others
emphasize what is underneath—a warehouse full of servers. No
single deﬁnition is ‘‘best” for all purposes.
2.2. Cloud features
The following features, especially the ﬁrst three, are commonly
associated with clouds. A consumer can be an individual lab, a con-
sortium participant, or a consortium.
 Resource outsourcing: Instead of a consumer providing their own
hardware, the cloud vendor assumes responsibility for hardware
acquisition and maintenance.
 Utility computing: The consumer requests additional resources as
needed, and similarly releases these resources when they are
not needed. Different clouds offer different sorts of resources,
e.g., processing, storage, management software, or application
services [6].
 Large numbers of machines: Clouds are typically constructed using
large numbers of inexpensive machines. As a result, the cloud
vendor canmore easily add capacity and canmore rapidly replace
machines that fail, compared with having machines in multiple
laboratories. Generally speaking these machines are as homoge-
neous as possible both in terms of conﬁguration and location.
 Automated resource management: This feature encompasses a
variety of conﬁguration tasks typically handled by a system
administrator. For example, many clouds offer the option of
automated backup and archival. The cloud may move data or
computation to improve responsiveness. Some clouds monitor
their offerings for malicious activity.
 Virtualization: Hardware resources in clouds are usually virtual;
they are shared by multiple users to improve efﬁciency. That is,
several lightly-utilized logical resources can be supported by the
same physical resource.
 Parallel computing: Map/Reduce and Hadoop are frameworks for
expressing and executing easily-parallelizable computations,
which may use hundreds or thousands of processors in a cloud.
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cations and masks any failed processes.3. Consortium computing
Clouds are candidates for several roles in biomedical comput-
ing, ranging from compute services to archival storage to acting
as a neutral zone among laboratories in a consortium. Individual
labs often include basic servers. Labs that engage in computation-
ally expensive research (e.g., protein folding or simulations) may
rely on clusters of high-performance machines with fast intercon-
nects between processors. At the other extreme, international
repositories (e.g., SwissProt and GenBank) require extensive stor-
age, but less impressive computational power. Between these ex-
tremes are biomedical consortia that facilitate the exchange of
data and applications among its participants. In this section, we
provide an overview of biomedical computing infrastructure, pay-
ing particular attention to the needs of consortia.
3.1. Laboratory infrastructure
To meet its research needs, a laboratory must build or acquire
computational infrastructure. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the most basic
capabilities include computation, storage, and network bandwidth.
These resources are managed by an operating system, which also
provides simple mechanisms for coordinating application requests
(e.g., to register and invoke services) and for enforcing policy. On
top of the operating system, one layers complex generic infrastruc-
ture (such as a database management system–DBMS, catalog, dig-
ital library, or workﬂow manager) and complex policies. Uniquely
biomedical infrastructure (e.g., BLAST) leverages this generic infra-Fig. 1. A generic computing infrastructure employed at local laboratories, managed
by the laboratory itself or a consortium for data sharing.structure. Finally, one deploys biomedical applications built atop
the underlying layers.
3.2. Biomedical research consortia
Today, one typically provides servers within a laboratory; insti-
tutional data centers provide a second option. However, a single
institution cannot provide all the needed resources, and collabora-
tions go beyond its boundary. The complexity of deploying compu-
tational infrastructure, especially across multiple institutions, has
encouraged creation of many independent biomedical consortia
to facilitate sharing data and software among labs. The consortium
provides the skills and resources needed to support a rich set of
capabilities, ofﬂoading some work from the laboratory. Individual
laboratories can then focus on extending the higher, biomedical-
speciﬁc layers.
Traditionally, these consortia have contributed to all layers of
the computational stack. As surveyed in the next section, fre-
quently, they create a grid that provides a uniﬁed interface, and
some management capabilities, for a large set of machines.
3.3. Grid infrastructure for consortia
Grid technologies have proved useful in the scientiﬁc commu-
nity, enabling researchers to employ computation, data, and soft-
ware across a range of machines. Surveys appear in [4], [7], and
[8]. Underneath the interface that consumers see, grid implemen-
tations typically connect independently owned and geographically
distributed servers. Naturally, there is also a need to federate
across several grids or clouds [9].
Some notable grids use machines volunteered from the general
public to provide cheap computational power for long-running
computations that require more resources than one institution
can afford, e.g., large, decomposable problems in protein folding
or astronomical signal analysis [10] and [11]. The price is unbeat-
able (machine time is free, the grid software is open source, and
Internet trafﬁc is cheap). However, this approach does not guaran-
tee fast response, or provide robust, always-available storage.
Worse, it cannot be used with sensitive data – since an untrustwor-
thy host machine can easily bypass grid security [12].
Several biomedical consortia have built their own grids, federat-
ing the data and applications contributed by their members. Such
grids often employ sophisticated open source software such as Glo-
bus for computation [13] and the Storage Resource Broker for large
data sets [14]. Commercial digital library systems from IBM, Micro-
soft, etc., provide rather similar capabilities to the latter [15]. Such
grid software offers substantial management capabilities, such as
catalogs for discovery (e.g., ﬁnd images based on metadata values),
and mechanisms for ensuring data security and privacy. The cata-
log and security services face demands (unmet in some initial re-
leases) for high availability and for rapid scale-up to handle
surges when large numbers of new images need to be registered
and processed. As they mature, clouds will be an attractive candi-
date. Grids also often support such as sequence similarity search
[16] or image processing [17], tasks that require substantial com-
putational power. Sometimes the code is tuned to particular pro-
cessor and interconnect designs, making it difﬁcult to port to
other hardware.
The consortium often imposes minimum requirements on the
participants’ hardware and software conﬁgurations. For example,
the BIRN requires participants to install standardized hardware
racks [18]. These requirements (to be removed in the next-gener-
ation BIRN) can represent a signiﬁcant barrier to entry, especially
for small laboratories. Overviews of the experiences of the BIRN
and caBIG consortium grids appear in [15] and [19]. Several tech-
nologies and demonstration systems are surveyed in [20].
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Institutional authorities need to be satisﬁed that sharing
arrangements are appropriate and secure. Also, institutions may
require adherence to hardware, software, or governance standards,
which may conﬂict with the standards required by a consortium.
Such constraints can lead to laborious negotiations, delays, missing
capabilities, and vulnerabilities. This section describes three major
areas that concern institutional authorities, and separates out is-
sues that are unaffected by whether a cloud is used.
3.4.1. Data privacy
The institution is obligated to protect data that it generates or
receives from partners. To do so, review boards must ask whether
the planned usage for the data is appropriate (e.g., ethical and cov-
ered by patient consent), and whether the external recipient seems
trustworthy.
We can now provide two substantial simpliﬁcations for analyz-
ing the effect of clouds on privacy. First, while vetting the appropri-
ateness of proposed usage is important, it can be handled as a
separate process, independent of the mechanisms used to achieve
sharing. It will thus not be further discussed. Second, at the top le-
vel, we can treat trustworthiness of the sharing mechanism much
as we would treat trustworthiness of an external research partner.
For example, similar top level questions (below) apply to either, ‘‘Is
a pharmaceutical company in France a trustworthy partner to re-
ceive our data?” or ‘‘Is a sharing mechanism implemented at a data
center hosted in France a suitable recipient?”
We formulate our discussions of Trustworthiness in terms of
three questions. First, is the recipient legitimate (i.e., do we think
they mean well)? The recipient’s reputation, including organiza-
tional afﬁliation and certiﬁcations, may guide such decisions. Har-
vard or IBM might be acceptable, respectively, for research or
cloud; unknown unafﬁliated researchers or startup companies
might not. Second, to avoid misunderstandings, has the recipient
made appropriate promises (accepted obligations) about degree of
system protection and about enforcing the owner’s policy about
sharing the data onward? (A recipient laboratory might simply
promise not to pass the data onward, but a sharing mechanism will
need to enforce a complex policy. Each recipient might be required
to maintain ﬁrewalls, to limit staff access, and conduct regular
audits). Third, are the recipient’s technical and human systems able
to meet their obligations to protect data against attacks and
carelessness?
3.4.2. Protecting other systems
When a lab hosts consortium or other externally-accessible re-
sources, external trafﬁc must traverse the institution’s networks
and ﬁrewall.1 This traversal increases risks of congestion and mal-
ware, especially if the ﬁrewall is loosened to accommodate the trafﬁc
(e.g., to allow database accesses from outside the institution). Also,
whenever the consortium’s services and membership expand, risks
may need to be reexamined.
3.4.3. Efﬁciency and standards
Institutions often seek to reduce costs by reducing heterogene-
ity. For example, site licensing agreements or chief information
ofﬁcer (CIO) mandates at one institution may require Oracle dat-
abases on Sun servers. These institutional policies may conﬂict
with consortium requirements to use PostgreSQL on HP. If a labo-
ratory does not get the necessary waivers, the multi-institution
data-sharing consortium will thus have heterogeneous hardware1 A ﬁrewall prevents unwanted trafﬁc from crossing a perimeter, usually by ﬁltering
a message header based on local policy. Firewalls understand networks, ports, and
servers, but not individual users or stored data items.and software. Some applications may fail, or run very slowly, and
extra costs will be incurred for training, software conversion, and
conﬁguration management.4. Clouds
Cloud vendors effectively sell computation and storage re-
sources as commodities, providing users with the illusion of a sin-
gle virtual machine or cluster, implemented over thousands of the
vendor’s computers (in some cases, virtual and physical machines
correspond 1-to-1). Some cloud vendors and third parties sell high-
er-level resources, such as the GoogleApp application platform,
relational DBMSs [21], or the SalesForce application. Underneath,
the virtual resources are mapped transparently to the underlying
physical resources, optionally subject to constraints on geographic
location (e.g., replicate at a remote site, but stay within the Euro-
pean Union). The customer controls the virtual machine’s capacity
(computational and storage) by sending the cloud vendor a service
request to add or subtract resources as needed. The time to gain or
release capacity (for small fractions of the provider’s inventory) is
typically measured in minutes, not months.
Fig. 2 illustrates graphically the layers that cloud offerings often
allow to be ofﬂoaded. Note that this diagram is essentially identical
to the server architecture described above in Fig. 1. The difference
lies in who is responsible for providing the lower-level capabilities.
Like a lab’s cluster from Sun or HP, a cloud provides a base upon
which customers build their own applications. The general infra-
structure layer provides capabilities needed by application build-
ers (e.g., databases) and system administrators (e.g., security
mechanisms). The next layer provides capabilities widely neededFig. 2. Clouds can ofﬂoad the responsibility of the bottom two layers of a basic
computing infrastructure.
2 Since DBMS efﬁciency and failure tolerance depends on low level interactions
with disks, one must both run performance benchmarks and ensure that virtual disks
truly persist.
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capabilities and applications to meet its own needs. As Fig. 2
shows, many additional layers of capabilities still need to be pro-
vided by a consortium, a system integrator, or biomedical software
environment vendor. Regardless of the underlying infrastructure,
customers still need to provide everything speciﬁc to their own
application.
4.1. Cloud infrastructure for biomedical consortia
As discussed above, biomedical researchers are beginning to
rely on consortium grids, due to the difﬁculties of managing labo-
ratory silos when researchers from multiple institutions need to
share data. However, laboratories still acquire their consortium-
support hardware conventionally, with substantial delays, need
for physical space, and limited economy of scale. They still face
the management difﬁculties of either heterogeneous underpin-
nings or being forced to acquire uniform systems. Labs small re-
source pool makes it hard to rapidly increase or decrease capacity.
Clouds offer many management services similar to grids, but
their underpinnings have a ‘‘mass production” ﬂavor. They typi-
cally use large data centers with many thousands of processors, ac-
quired and managed by one organization, often kept fairly uniform.
Within a data center, the network bandwidth is usually high,
allowing the underlying computers to share data with one another
efﬁciently (though not as fast as a specialized cluster). Public
clouds contain data from multiple customers and problem do-
mains; the consequent security tradeoffs are discussed in Section
6. The cloud can be owned either by the vendor (creating control
and legal issues, discussed in Section 6.3), or, for private clouds,
possibly by the customer organization.
Compared with scientiﬁc data centers, clouds offer economies
of scale and the ability to adjust to workload variations. They have
attracted wide interest, going beyond the scientiﬁc community.
4.2. Sample cloud vendors
We now provide sample data points—gleaned from company
announcements, blogs, and other sources—about current cloud
capabilities and the directions cloud computing seems to be
headed. Of course, the landscape of offerings is likely to change
rapidly. Clouds are offered externally, or used internally, by the
following:
 Internet companies: These may offer space for rent on clouds they
run to support their normal operations or create new clouds for
customer use.
s Amazon, the current leader, sells virtual servers on its cloud
(EC2) [22], along with simple message queuing (SQS) [22],
ﬁle space (Simple Storage Service—S3 [23]), an n-tuple store
(SimpleDB) [24], an announced UNIX ﬁle system, and several
other services [25]. These support commonly used virtual
machines (e.g., Linux, Windows), can run many popular soft-
ware products (e.g., databases, though performance needs
deeper investigation), and present an idiosyncratic interface
for storage and management.
s Other Internet companies such as Google [26], Yahoo! [27],
and Microsoft MSN [28] already use clouds to support their
own operations [29], including extensive parallelism. Some
of their publically available cloud applications (e.g., search,
gmail) were written to match their own clouds’ interfaces
(e.g., Google’s cloud facilitates parallelism). Multiple such
interfaces are expected. IBM and other major vendors are
expected to offer Amazon-like infrastructure capabilities,
together with enterprise-quality management, security, and
robustness. Enterprise-internal clouds: Many computer companies are
expected to help large enterprises set up their own clouds, inter-
nal to their own ﬁrewalls. Such an arrangement may alleviate
worries about control and liability (e.g., requirements of the Sar-
banes-Oxley law), but will not help facilitate cross-institutional
data sharing. The US Department of Defense has contracted to
create a private cloud that follows military security practices
[30]; advocates tout improvements in speed of procurement.
Hybrid clouds may soon federate a public cloud with a private
cloud that hosts more sensitive data.
 Small players: Several relatively small companies host clouds
already, as well as help enterprises acquire their own clouds.
For example, 3Tera claims to provide many management ser-
vices absent in Amazon and to already host MySQL comfortably
[31].
 Application providers: Rather than running their own server
farms, these companies and consortia provide versions of their
products that run on clouds. DBMSs2 now available on the cloud
include Oracle, DB2, Vertica, and MySQL. On the other hand, the
robust, distributed S3 storage poses problems for DBMS capabili-
ties [32]. For parallel computing, there is Apache’s Hadoop, an
open source analog of Google’s MapReduce parallelization facility.
This facility allows one to easily deploy a highly parallel biomed-
ical research service such as BLAST [16].
The cloud vendor’s business proposition is that, as a service pro-
vider (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Amazon, IBM, or a smaller player),
they can buy, power, manage, and repair a massive array of rather
uniform servers in a large warehouse, at a much lower unit cost
than can a single university, or consortium that spans geographi-
cally distributed laboratories.
Our specimen cost analysis below shows that this cost proposi-
tion is very plausible. Current prices for resources on commercial
clouds are very attractive for some applications, and our calcula-
tions suggest that these prices are based on real low costs, not mar-
keting ploys. Armbrust et al. [21] and Hamilton [33] suggest even
larger savings. The technical strengths and emerging competition
suggest that these favorable trends will continue [34]. Nonetheless,
there are applications where today’s clouds are more costly; e.g.,
Amazon charges heavily for moving data on and off the cloud,
and if inactive users remain connected, continues to charge for
their virtual machines.
The choice is not binary. An institutional data center exhibits
some cloud characteristics (e.g., virtualization, services on demand,
collocated servers) that may sometimes be an attractive alternative
to laboratory-based computing, especially when data is not shared
with outsiders. They may offer greater local knowledge and per-
haps lower communication costs and fewer legal, and are consid-
ered in our tradeoff discussions below.5. Evaluating the tradeoffs of using clouds
Advocates expect that clouds will soon become the default way
to host highly ﬂexible shared data repositories. Still, each organiza-
tion must perform a comparison for its needs. This section de-
scribes areas where an organization needs to understand and
evaluate the changes that a cloud would bring them—dollar costs
to be considered (Section 5.1), and qualitative changes, such as
reducing delay in expanding a sharing arrangement (Section 5.2).
Security comparisons appear in Section 6,
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This section examines three major cost drivers: system admin-
istration, idle capacity, and power usage and facilities. At each step,
we provide specimen cost ﬁgures for conventional systems, ex-
tracted from our organization and from web postings. The speci-
men analysis is a coarse approximation, because environments
vary greatly, e.g., electricity rates can differ by a factor of four with-
in the USA, and administrative loads per server differ enormously.
Our calculations assume very conservatively that research organi-
zations procure hardware, bandwidth, and facilities (buildings
and power) at the same price as cloud vendors. Others, with access
to more detailed data, have estimated factors of roughly 5–7 in fa-
vor of giant purchasers (such as cloud vendors) [33]. However, our
sample organizations did have relatively high administration costs;
others may do better. With these ﬁgures, we see a very large gap
(factor of three) in underlying costs between cloud-based and con-
ventional solutions. We conclude from this rough analysis that, de-
spite our plentiful margin of error, the fundamentals seem very
favorable as an alternative to new laboratory machines; well man-
aged data centers fall somewhere in the middle.
5.1.1. System administration
Low-level system administrative costs can be quite high for lab-
oratory systems scattered around an institution, often far greater
than raw hardware costs. A cloud lets an organization ofﬂoad three
sorts of low-level administration. First, the cloud vendor is respon-
sible for system infrastructure (the lower levels of Fig. 1—hardware
maintenance, spare parts, adding newmachines, and infrastructure
software). Second, once a backup policy is speciﬁed, the cloud ven-
dor executes it. Finally, an application can be installed once, and
becomes available to all authorized users.3 At higher levels, admin-
istrators deal with many application-support and upgrade issues, as
well as user management. Moving to a cloud should not greatly
change such work, so in keeping with our ‘‘relative” approach, we
do not include it.
In severe cases, the low-level administration costs can be greater
than the total cost for a cloud service.Wedescribe several data points
for specimen low-level administration costs, assuming salary cost of
$100K per administrator staff year. Administration costs seem most
signiﬁcant with either loose management, volatile requirements, or
hardware scattered around many rooms on a campus.
 Using anecdotal evidence about some MITRE systems, we esti-
mated that 1/3 of administrators’ time is spent on low-level
administration. The 2/3 spent on user management and local
applications is excluded from our cost estimates. This facility
supports prototyping projects, and their frequent reconﬁgura-
tions may account for a relatively high cost. Each administrator
handled about 30 processors, so low-level infrastructure and
software distribution work comes to 1.1% of a staff year per
server, or $1.1K per server year (assuming a three year server
lifespan, low-level administration costs slightly more than the
hardware).
 One government organization has about 8 servers per adminis-
trator. Assuming the same 1/3 ratio of low-level administration,
this costs $3.75K per year per server.4
 The BIRN consortium suggests that backup will consume 10% of
an administrator per rack5, and that hardware maintenance will3 Note that open source or user-developed applications may be hosted in this wa
Business models for licensing commercial applications (such as Oracle) on the clou
are immature and evolving.
4 The organization is rolling out a new offering, which should be more efﬁcient




7/cost extra. Software distribution is managed efﬁciently by the
central staff across dozens of homogeneous racks, and costs little
(a multiprocessor rack, switching, and cabling may come to $30K,
while just the backup component of low-level administration over
a three year life matches this ﬁgure). Our cost estimate is conser-
vative, omitting several costs that were not publicly reported—
power, hardware setup and maintenance, and negotiating institu-
tional ﬁrewall issues. We estimate administrative costs as being at
least equal to the purchase cost of a server.
For some laboratories, our estimates of current practice may be
pessimistic. Hamilton [35] estimates 140 servers per administrator
for moderate scale institutional data centers (much less than hard-
ware costs). There are also qualitative advantages to local staff,
who understand people, practices, and priorities. However, institu-
tional centers still represent a loss of control by the laboratory.
Also, for an organization experiencing high costs, advice to get bet-
ter management and more skillful staff in the lab is hard to follow.
Many labs may ﬁnd it preferable to outsource to institutional data
centers or clouds, for more professional management.
5.1.2. Idle capacity
In conventional systems, system resource utilization is low,
estimated at 15–20% for data centers [36]; other estimates are low-
er. There are multiple causes for low utilization. Systems managers
tend to buy for near-peak and future loads, and thus do not use the
whole capacity all the time. Differences in work schedules and pro-
ject maturity will lead to peaks and valleys (the analysis in [21]
adds an extra charge for requests that were not served because
load exceeded capacity). In contrast, a cloud (or institutional data
center) smoothes these effects across many customers, and today
may attain 40% utilization [37], with higher values plausible in
clouds (e.g., as load sharing over time zones becomes more mature,
and exploiting more diverse user bases). One virtual server seems
likely to do the work of at least 2.5 typically-utilized servers. We
expect similar ﬁgures for bandwidth utilization. For storage, the
utilization savings will be less dramatic—data must be stored even
when not in use.
5.1.3. Power usage and facilities
Server power is expensive, while cooling and other overhead
power consumption is assessed to be at least comparable [38]. To-
gether, they at least equal server purchase costs, for typical servers
today. Cloud vendors can do much better than the typical labora-
tory, or even institutional data center, based on better manage-
ment of voltage conversions, cooler climates and better cooling,
and lower electricity rates (cloud vendors tend to cluster near
hydropower). They also often locate where real estate is cheap.
5.1.4. Specimen cost comparison
We now give a specimen analysis of the cost of supporting a
biomedical application on Amazon web services. Echoing many
others, we conclude that cloud computing is already very cost-
effective in some settings. When one reaches an acquisition stage,
one needs to redo the cost calculation for the speciﬁc system being
built, and with current cost quotes from cloud vendors, and then
bring in qualitative and security issues.
Consider a grid that includes 23 TB of data and 60 processors,
with uploads of 40 GB per month and downloads of 13GB per
month—roughly comparable to the size of the system managed
by BIRN. A conventional system needs 60 processors that cost
approximately $1K per year, or $60K total, in early 2009. Storage
for 60TB costs about $6K, or only $2K per year. Assuming that
one administrator can manage 30 machines (and that one third
of the administrator’s time is spent on low-level maintenance),
there is an additional maintenance cost of $66K per year. The pur-
6 Amazon’s cloud has experienced well publicized downtime. While this may be a
sign of immaturity, an acquirer should certainly look at their vendor’s track record.
We are not aware of any loss of persistent data.
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each year billed to the laboratory, plus an additional $60K in en-
ergy costs (though these may be hidden in institutional overhead)
and undetermined costs for space and network bandwidth.
Of course, many of the processors are frequently idle; assuming
16% utilization (vs. 40% for a cloud), only 24 processors would need
to be rented from a cloud vendor. Using Amazon’s online EC2 cal-
culator [22] in May 2009, a cloud-based system would cost $3.4K
per month for data storage and bandwidth (uploads and down-
loads). The processors cost an additional $1.7K per month. Thus,
the cost of using the cloud is $61K each year, which includes hard-
ware, power, operating system, basic security and infrastructure
administration, backup of the persistent store, and application
replication.
Though this cost comparison is an estimate, it demonstrates
that for new systems, clouds’ rental costs look quite attractive.
Even omitting power costs, our specimen estimate shows clouds
to be superior by roughly a factor of 3 for providing infrastructure
and replicating applications.
5.2. Qualitative beneﬁts
This section addresses ways in which a system built using
clouds can reduce the burden on laboratory managers, be more
scalable and resilient (so users get better service), and make it eas-
ier to share data and tools.
5.2.1. Less to manage
Today, managers of laboratories or biomedical consortia need to
manage physical systems, capital expenditures, and acquisitions of
multiple kinds of hardware and software. This task can become sig-
niﬁcantly simpler when hardware and network acquisition, main-
tenance, and management are ofﬂoaded to the clouds as illustrated
in Fig. 2. For physical security (protecting your disks from theft),
outages, or disaster recovery, the laboratory or consortium must
specify a level of service and a vendor capable of implementing it
(vendors, like in house staff, must be chosen carefully, and are fal-
lible). The net effect, subject to caveats in Section 6, is that the sys-
tems burden on principal investigators or consortium managers is
reduced.
Chargeback policies are a complex area, and we will not exam-
ine them in depth. Whatever policy is chosen, explicit charges per
use make it more transparent, but managers may wish to impose
limits.
Laboratories still have the right, and the requirement, to man-
age who accesses their virtual machines. To do so, they may em-
ploy ﬁrewall, authentication and authorization systems from the
cloud vendor, or, for greater sophistication, from third parties (as
applications on their virtual servers and virtual ﬁrewalls).
5.2.2. Scalability
When the workload experiences signiﬁcant change, a cloud can
add or release resources in minutes. A cloud can provide extra pro-
cessing resources during the peaks (within limits) when the trans-
action load spikes (such as for access to Swine Flu clinical data).
One can improve response time on large, parallelizable tasks by
applying many servers, as opposed to running a single laboratory
server for hours. Further, one pays for resources actually used,
not for capacity.
However, some users have had unpleasant surprises about costs
associated with unexpectedly heavy use of cloud resources. With
conventional hardware, one knows how much money is commit-
ted; with resources on demand, programsmay spend unexpectedly
large sums of money if I/O volume is unexpectedly high, or users
silently fail to release unneeded servers and storage. These effects
are difﬁcult to monitor. We expect some cloud vendors to offersuitable throttling services soon; until then, administrators need
to be vigilant.
5.2.3. Superior resiliency
Cloud vendors store backups of users’ applications and data in
multiple geographical locations. If a machine fails, others can take
over, at the same location, or between locations (for disaster
recovery).
A laboratory that implements its own fault tolerance and disas-
ter recovery requires management effort (mentioned above); addi-
tional software, hardware, and space beyond those included in the
‘‘conventional” costs in Section 5.1; and additional risks (users who
manage recovery poorly may lose all their data, e.g., in a ﬂood). A
cloud potentially reduces all three.6 Even for a laboratory that opts
to retain its own servers, a cloud can still be useful for archiving and
remote data backup.
5.2.4. Homogeneity
A consortium system implemented in a cloud can give all
authorized investigators access to the same tools, such as workﬂow
tools to process images taken from biomedical scanners. In con-
trast, peer to peer sharing without consortium managers is unli-
kely to provide all relevant tools, and keep them up to date. In a
grid implemented over a heterogeneous environment, the consor-
tium cannot easily manage tools that run natively over the differ-
ent operating systems. Alternatively, while a consortium grid built
over homogeneous lab-hosted resources can distribute and man-
age tools effectively, the dedicated system increases cost and will
deter translational science collaborations that need only occasional
access.
5.2.5. Fewer issues to negotiate with institutional authorities
We now reconsider the concerns raised in Section 3.4, from the
perspective of cloud computing. The institution’s concern that non-
compliant products in a lab may increase the cost of institutional
support does not apply when the products are part of an externally
hosted consortium service, so no negotiations will be needed.
Negotiations about protecting other systems in the lab or the
institution are likely to be signiﬁcantly reduced. When consortium
resources are hosted inside the institution, trafﬁc involving those
resources may put other systems at the institution at risk. The
lab may need to negotiate exceptions from the institution’s ﬁrewall
to allow the trafﬁc in, and to negotiate increases in institutional
bandwidth. Unfortunately, if the lab gets its way, the institution’s
ﬁrewall protections are weakened and congestion may result. If
the lab cannot negotiate the changes, data sharing is blocked.
Either way, both researchers and institutions must devote substan-
tial time and skill [12], [39], and [40], and collaborative research
must wait.
Cloud-hosted resources cut the Gordian knot by keeping the
new, potentially malicious trafﬁc outside the institution, beneﬁting
both the institution and the laboratory, reducing both risk and
negotiations. In the same vein, no negotiation is needed if compu-
tations on the cloud wish to employ other services available exter-
nally, e.g., data mining or BLAST. Yet another positive scenario
results if the lab hosts computations on external researchers’ sen-
sitive data. In fact, one may wish to reorganize workﬂows to min-
imize trafﬁc impinging on the various institutions.
Hosting data externally avoids the risk that external requests
will place a heavy load on the institution’s network. There are
two small countervailing factors. First, the laboratory needs some
bandwidth to post its data to the cloud. Also, if a laboratory needs
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it may keep a local replicate to avoid transferring the data repeat-
edly. Fortunately, Post trafﬁc requires only that the institution sup-
ply low priority bandwidth (batch is tolerable), and the storage
cost for replication is low (Section 5.1.4). Thus, cloud-hosted sys-
tems seem to require less negotiation of bandwidth.
One also needs to negotiate ﬁrewall policy changes just enough
to allow data and security information to be sent to the labora-
tory’s own virtual machine on the cloud. This opening seems much
narrower than allowing a variety of service calls from a variety of
partners. Again, the need for negotiation seems reduced.
A laboratory may then take advantage of a cloud to add collab-
orators more rapidly. New collaborators no longer require greater
internal processing resources, nor do they need to negotiate band-
width increases and ﬁrewall changes. As mentioned in Section 3.4,
the cloud does not remove a laboratory’s responsibility to manage
who can access what resources. Security policies and enforcement
software are a necessary part of the infrastructure and need atten-
tion from the laboratory, whether on conventional servers or in a
cloud.
Service level agreements tend to be more formal with a cloud,
unless a customer accepts the provider’s default. Thus, outsourc-
ing requires the customer to be more explicit about require-
ments, and then to negotiate guarantees or choose among the
provider’s offerings. When systems staff understands the needs,
a cheaper informal process might sufﬁce. When problems arise,
a laboratory head has great leverage on her staff, but there
may be limited machine and human resources to respond, and
no explicit guarantees.
The remaining criterion was to ‘‘protect the laboratory’s data”.
Trustworthiness of the sharing mechanism on the cloud raises
the same top level questions (see Section 3.4) as for a new research
collaborator, e.g., how well the recipient protects against hackers.
However, institutions may be reluctant to approve hosting in
clouds until vendors have accumulated a substantial history,
showing no more breaches than ordinary systems. Hence negotia-
tions will increase. The next section further explores data security.6. Security of data stored in a cloud
Security is one of the major concerns when laboratories con-
sider moving sensitive information to machines they do not own
[41]. This section examines the security impact of outsourcing a
laboratory’s data to either a data center, to a cloud, or to a conven-
tional managed consortium grid over lab-hosted systems. We
emphasize conﬁdentiality, because that seems the greatest barrier
to sharing arrangements; however, some comments also apply to
other aspects of security (integrity, denial of service). We ﬁnd that
some risks decrease and some increase, with neither side of the
argument overwhelming the other. Thus, each laboratory or con-
sortium will need to assess security for its environment, while also
considering the tradeoffs in the previous section.
Our security analysis considers two scenarios that differ in
terms of how much is to be outsourced: (1) Just the data and appli-
cations intended for external access (while maintaining unshared
data locally); or (2) All of the data and applications on the lab ser-
ver. Intermediate points and redundant hosting are possible, but
not discussed.
As the number of partners and shared resources increase, one
will face extra labor to manage permissions. There is also extra risk
of inappropriate data release, due to having more users who may
misunderstand policy or be careless or malicious. However, this in-
crease is not greatly affected by where the laboratory resources are
hosted. For example, when an authorized recipient sells patient
health records to a tabloid, the problem was not in the technicalsystem. Hence, as in Section 3.2, we omit issues that seem not to
vary with hosting.
We decompose the analysis into several parts. Section 6.1 ad-
dresses several operational issues. Section 6.2 deals with external
intrusions by hackers, a risk that concerns many decision makers
but is perhaps not increased as greatly as some think. Section 6.3
examines nontechnical risks of outsourcing from a laboratory,
and Section 6.4 summarizes security issues (see also [42]).
6.1. Security management
First, a laboratory must continue to manage security. Machines
on a cloud still may need ﬁrewalls and virtual private networks,
and so forth. The laboratory will still need to acquire security man-
agement software (commercial or open source). Thus, one must
examine whether one’s chosen security software actually runs well
on the cloud, including potential technical or licensing difﬁculties.
Also, one may need additional approvals to place sensitive security
metadata (e.g., user identities and relationships) on clouds; prod-
ucts that use encrypted or hashed metadata are to be preferred.
On the other hand, outside the institutional ﬁrewall, it may be eas-
ier to provide access from other institutions. Finally, if require-
ments are rudimentary, e.g., that all consortium members can
share all posted data, they may be able to use cloud vendors’
built-in security mechanisms.
Second, system administrators often possess excessive privi-
leges—a signiﬁcant risk. Compared with laboratories, practices in
virtualized data centers (institutional or cloud) are likely to have
greater formality, separating the administration of different as-
pects of a system. In particular, while laboratory administrators
and security staff may be allowed to read and change the data they
administer, a cloud vendor will tend to treat each customer’s vir-
tual machine as a private preserve. On the other hand, institutional
and especially cloud administrators will have more difﬁculty dis-
tinguishing illegitimate access or understanding laboratory priori-
ties—outsourcing can break a valuable human network.
Third, physical security protects against threats such as stealing
disks or adding tapping devices (attached or remote) to the hard-
ware and networks hosting the biomedical data. On balance, cloud
and institutional data centers seem better on this criterion. Data
centers are generally quite secure physically, while laboratories’
security levels differ drastically. Also, unencrypted CDs and laptops
have led to high proﬁle breaches. When data is available on the
cloud, there is less impetus for lab personnel to travel with their
own copy or to share by shipping a CD. Also, while a large data cen-
ter (institutional or cloud) is a richer target, targeted attacks within
the cloud against a speciﬁc laboratory’s database are difﬁcult, since
it is hard to determine which server or disk holds the data. On the
other hand, if one physical machine in the data center is pene-
trated, eventually it may host something the attacker wants.
6.2. Risks due to hackers
Wherever a laboratory stores its data, internally or externally,
outside hackers pose a threat. This section considers how the hack-
er risk and security management labor change if one moves data
from a laboratory to a cloud or to an institution’s central data
center.
The laboratory will need to decide what hacker risks are accept-
able, in return for the other promised advantages. For example,
neither clouds nor institutional data centers are as hacker-proof
as a laboratory server without Internet access, which does not need
to share biomedical data with outside users.
A cloud is shared among many users, at both the macro level
(open to many users) and a micro level (multiple virtual resources
on each physical one). An institutional data center is also shared,
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sharing (called multi-tenancy). Section 6.2.2 considers advantages
when one splits among virtual machines.
6.2.1. Multi-tenancy risks
Virtual machines share physical resources, relying on a software
hypervisor to keep them appropriately separate (multi-tenancy can
also arise at the application level, and the application provides the
separation among users). The cloud thus provides less separation
than when one has separate servers in a laboratory.
Like all complex software, hypervisors can be hacked, after
which an attacker can directly access the shared physical CPU, net-
work, or storage. He then can deny service, destroy data, or steal
conﬁdential data. Researchers have demonstrated many ways to
hack a hypervisor, and virtualization vendors have provided exten-
sive analyses of ways to reduce the risk [43,44]. As of December
2008, no malicious exploits had been reported [45].
A laboratory machine has the signiﬁcant advantage that an at-
tacker has little legitimate access. An institutional data center or
private cloud makes its capability available to many hundred
users; a public cloud allows anyone with a credit to run arbitrary
programs. The need to arrange payment is still a barrier against
automated, broadcast attacks.
To further assess the risk, note that targeted attacks seeking
speciﬁc lab’s biomedical data seem the most dangerous. Fortu-
nately, it may be difﬁcult for attackers to know which physical ma-
chine to attack, if they are targeting a speciﬁc lab’s data. To make it
more difﬁcult for an attack that subverts one of a lab’s systems to
ﬁnd the others, one might wish to scatter them to different phys-
ical servers, if the virtualization system permits.
Institutional data centers and clouds do have some countervail-
ing defenses. Both are likely to have a professional security staff,
unlike a laboratory. Clouds that provide only an application frame-
work with limited interfaces (e.g., just web service calls) are some-
what easier to secure. For comparison, laboratories’ conventional
infrastructure—operating systems, DBMSs, and web servers—
already have many, many known vulnerabilities. The key, then, is
to estimate the incremental risk.
6.2.2. Protections at virtual machine boundaries
Security professionals traditionally recommend partitioning a
system as a means of protection. One can put a ﬁrewall on any lab-
oratory server, wherever the server is hosted. The ease of creating
new virtual machines provides ways to improve the security of vir-
tually-hosted data by creating new boundaries. In this section, we
examine the utility of partitioning resources into separate areas,
conferring protections against attacks that do not break the hyper-
visor to intrude into other virtual machines.
Consider that if two data items are on the same system, then
that system must be accessible to anyone who accesses either
item. For sake of example, suppose item D1 is to be shared with se-
lected collaborators, and D2 is to be made publicly accessible. Now
suppose we place D1 and D2 on the laboratory’s server. Due to our
desire to share, especially for D2, we have vastly increased the set
of people who can access the laboratory server. There is increased
risk for all the other data on that server. Avoiding this phenomenon
may be the greatest security beneﬁt of hosting in a cloud.
If instead one hosted the shared resources on a cloud, there is
less risk to the laboratory’s other resources. Next, one might be
able to partition the resources so that D1 and D2 reside on separate
virtual machines, each with a more restrictive ﬁrewall and fewer
user accounts. Now an attacker who reaches D2 does not threaten
D1. Further, the VM in the cloud is not acting as a general purpose
machine, so one can create a ﬁrewall that rejects unneeded types
of access (ports, protocols, services, etc.); it need only provide for
the intended sharing arrangements.An intermediate approach is to outsource to a new virtual ma-
chine in your institution’s virtualized data center, proceeding as
above. Now the laboratory obtains the beneﬁts, but the institu-
tion’s risks actually increase, as more users have accounts on its
data center virtual machines. Also, the institution’s ﬁrewall may
cause difﬁculties (as discussed in Section 3.4) while providing only
modest protection—that ﬁrewall may allow trafﬁc for often-hacked
applications (e.g., email) and there are thousands of potentially
malicious or playful employees or students inside. The institutional
ﬁrewall’s net security effect can even be negative if the illusion of
protection encourages laboratories to neglect their own security
measures.
6.3. Nontechnical outsourcing risks
To round out the picture, we now describe nontechnical risks to
cloud-based systems, and the risks’ common sense ameliorations.
The ideas here constitute conventional wisdom, not novelty, but
are important to consider. Further anecdotes and in depth discus-
sions appear in [42]. Our aim is to show organizations nontechnical
threats they need to address, and that these threats can be
overcome.
When a laboratory outsources hosting, it (or its consortium)
still ‘‘owns” its virtual machines and the resources at the cloud
or data center. Permissions, resource limits, and priorities must
be administered by lab or consortium administrators who can rec-
ognize legitimate usage, and have a human network that enables
rapid resolution of ambiguities. Still, outsourcing implies loss of
control in several ways.
When the cloud provider is a separate company, behavior may
become very adversarial. Agreements must be more carefully for-
malized, especially with respect to business disputes and closure.
Until the legal environment matures and standard practices
emerge, experience with commercial software provides some use-
ful analogies and practices. First, as a primary protection, choose a
cloud provider with a strong reputation and business, not an un-
known startup (except perhaps for short term usage). Beyond that,
choose suppliers whose contract language suits your needs, in
areas such as how they may use your data and request logs, protec-
tion from them freezing your data and applications in a business
dispute, and a structure that lets them guarantee advance warning
before cutting off service (even if they are sued by their suppliers,
or go bankrupt). Also, require your provider to provide sufﬁcient
documentation so you can port your system to an alternative, if
the provider cannot meet their obligations, or if competitors be-
come more attractive.
Multi-tenancy causes several nontechnical risks, in addition to
the hacking vulnerabilities discussed earlier. First, it is not yet clear
whether the legal system prohibits law enforcers or litigants from
seizing a multi-tenant system (by analogy, an apartment building)
to punish one of the tenants. We also need to hope that spam ﬁlters
and other site-reputation services are extended so they can distin-
guish among tenants and blackball only speciﬁc ones that have
been alleged to engage in malfeasance.
Next, laboratories may need to restrict where the cloud will
physically host their data and applications. For example, they
may wish to avoid countries whose governments are intrusive or
whose intellectual property laws seem inadequate. Amazon and
others have begun providing such controls for their cloud
environments.
Finally, academic researchers have argued that before hosting
sensitive data externally, one should encrypt it for fear that the
data will be stolen or modiﬁed by the cloud provider (as a business
strategy or rogue staff). The cost of doing so is high—strong encryp-
tion makes it difﬁcult to index the data, multiplying access costs.
Encryption resists some technical attacks (stealing ﬁles), but
A. Rosenthal et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 43 (2010) 342–353 351attackers can still come in the front door, by subverting a legiti-
mate requestor or the access control system. The nontechnical rea-
sons for distrust seem exaggerated. We trust banks not to dip into
individual customers’ accounts. Analogously, if a cloud vendor
were found to be violating their customers’ data as a matter of cor-
porate policy, they would instantly lose their business. Their staff
may have individual miscreants, but the same is true of a univer-
sity, hospital, or consortium. Furthermore, the cloud vendor is
likely to have better monitoring in place to prevent such activity.
6.4. Summarizing the security tradeoffs
Moving data to a cloud improves security for the systems that
remain inside a laboratory or institution. At a cloud, both data
and server backups can be arranged easily; if high availability is re-
quired (e.g., for 24/7 sensor data feeds), recovery to a second cloud
might be desired. The move also provides strong physical protec-
tion of the machines, and enables creation of separate virtual ma-
chines and ﬁrewalls for each independent laboratory application
(or honey pot). The cloud will also ﬁrmly separate system admin-
istration from data and application administration, and make avail-
able a security staff and tools. A well managed virtualized
institutional data center will provide all but the ﬁrst advantage,
to some extent. Disaster recovery becomes easier to manage (once
one decides how much protection to pay for).
On the other hand, remote administrators may understand less
of the local situation, and clouds present large attractive targets.
On a public cloud, any attacker with a credit card can establish
an account on some virtual machine in the cloud, to begin hacking
through the hypervisor, a risk that does not apply in conventional
systems. The contractual and legal issues become worse with a
cloud. Some leading vendors, e.g., Amazon, have not yet demon-
strated (or, to be fair, promised) high availability.
Neither approach seems uniformly superior, and experiences
are still sparse, but we can highlight a few observations. Risks need
to be assessed against the ‘‘background” risks: any Internet-con-
nected machine is vulnerable to many attacks, and authorized
recipients may fail to protect data. If a laboratory is not sharing
its data, replacing an internal server by one on a cloud seems to in-
crease the hacker risk to data conﬁdentiality and integrity—the
threat of hypervisor attacks probably outweighs extra security
staff. However, if partners already access the laboratory machines,
then the beneﬁts of good fences (Section 6.2.2) may outweigh the
cloud risks. Overall, the extra risks seem moderate, and may not
dominate the cost and convenience issues.7. Moving forward
The subsections below, respectively, consider what makes a
good target application for cloud computing, identify some poor
targets, and discuss difﬁculties in the transition process.
7.1. Good targets for near-term cloud initiatives
Clouds tends to be preferable when service demands are vari-
able or demand is unknown in advance, and where the cloud ven-
dor passes on large economies of scale in procuring servers, power,
and space, and in supplying specialized staff and tools. However,
even with favorable winds, one also needs to consider issues of
technology insertion. Informed by the above analyses, we identify
some promising areas for initial exploitation of cloud technology
for bioinformatics (these recommendations assume the conclusion
of Section 6, i.e., that security should not be a show-stopper). The
following factors make a project an attractive candidate for cloud
computing in the near term: The project has high costs for computing, administration, space,
and electric power in its current or envisioned state.
 The members wish to share with outsiders, but ﬁnd that institu-
tional policies block outsiders’ access to their local system.
 The project requires highly variable amounts of processing and
storage resources. For example, some workloads spike when
new data arrives; other sites may suddenly become highly pop-
ular (e.g., in the event of an epidemic). In addition, a system that
is being reengineered may need extra capacity during develop-
ment and testing, and later to run the existing and the replace-
ment system simultaneously.
 The system requires off-site backups for data and for processing.
 The applications have easily parallelized code (contrasting with
Section 7.2).
 One wants long-term repositories to outlive the laboratory that
now hosts the data.
General software management criteria apply as well. For exam-
ple, it is easier to introduce new technology (e.g., a cloud) packaged
within a new capability that beneﬁts the biomedical community,
such as more secure and rapid data sharing across a consortium.
In contrast, users and business managers resist technology-driven
replacements of systems they see as running smoothly.
Informed by the above analyses, we identify some promising
areas for initial exploitation of cloud technology for bioinformatics.
With new technologies, one usually wants to implement new capa-
bilities or solve major existing difﬁculties. If a system already
serves its users satisfactorily and is not being reengineered, the
net payoff (after cost of change) will tend to be lower, while resis-
tance may be high. Therefore, below we look at new functionality.
Archiving, backup, and fault tolerance: Whether data are private
to a laboratory or shared in a consortium, they need long-term
archiving (possibly outliving project funding or the Principal Inves-
tigator’s career), and protection from permanent failure (e.g., disk
crashes) and natural disasters. Even in more routine circumstances,
important resources such as catalogs should be able to run in two
places, to avoid temporary outages.
Sharing data and tools across a consortium: As discussed above,
clouds seem able to support cost-effective storage, access, and tool
execution, with suitable enforcement of access policies, and easier
management.
High performance computing (HPC): Some biomedical applica-
tions require extensive computation, often with uneven workloads
(e.g., submitting a batch of images). Good candidates for clouds in-
clude applications with many small, independent requests where
cost is a major driver (‘‘capacity computing”), plus some large prob-
lems where one wants faster response (‘‘capability computing”).
For example, distributed BLAST [1]—and in general, computations
where the Hadoop model is appropriate (signiﬁcant data parallel-
ism and reduction phases with relatively few stages)—are candi-
dates for a cloud. Also, even if the raw computation is unsuitable,
one might wish to use a cloud for sharing results, subject to the
usual cost and security tradeoffs.7.2. Less suitable targets
For comparison with the highly suitable targets above, this sec-
tion identiﬁes criteria that make a system a poor candidate for
transition to cloud. The last items refer to the environment rather
than the system itself.
First, some HPC applications (e.g., protein folding and high-end
image processing) exploit detailed physical characteristics of the
underlying hardware and require substantial data movement
among processors. In a cloud, the physical characteristics of the
hardware are not revealed by the vendor. HPC applications that
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Second, if one gets unfavorable results from the cost compari-
son (e.g., with Amazon today, due to heavy network trafﬁc) or
the security comparison (e.g., your local staff is highly skilled and
trustworthy, and you expect determined attacks on the virtualiza-
tion software), then clouds are unsuitable. Also, the legal barriers
to allowing a third party to manage the data may be insuperable
in some situations, at least for now. For very large users, such as
a government agency, a private cloud may be an attractive
alternative.
Third, if communications fail, the cloud becomes unavailable.
For applications that must be highly available and that need only
local data, a local solution seems better.
Next, cloud advocates may oversell, promoting a vision of per-
fectly shared data, workﬂows and repositories, displays, reports,
tools, etc. Merely changing how data is hosted will not improve
integration among your databases, create new applications, or
make investigators (who retain ultimate control) more willing to
share data. Achieving all the promised features will take consider-
able time and management resources and is therefore high-risk. It
may be wiser to begin with simple data sharing using off the shelf
tools.
Finally, existing projects will have inertia, and will require a
major cost advantage to motivate a transition to a cloud. Costs al-
ready incurred, ranging from hardware purchase to building a staff,
will not be recovered.7.3. Transition obstacles
The ﬁrst big obstacle is the discomfort of stakeholders (scien-
tists and institutional review boards) as two changes are proposed
simultaneously: allowing more external sharing and using a cloud
as the host. A biomedical researcher does not surrender control of
his data by placing them in a cloud—but managing this control will
require considerable work, as described in Section 5. Nevertheless,
these changes are likely to intertwine in stakeholders’ minds, and
the separation may need to be explained repeatedly. Other techni-
cal obstacles include:
 Software portability: Before one switches to a new environment,
one needs to ensure that critical applications (biomedical and
security) will continue to run, despite technical and licensing
issues. This is part of traditional transition planning and cannot
be ignored when moving to a cloud. For example, some cloud
offerings offer a non-standard programming environment or
lack persistent storage. While applications designed natively
for a cloud may not have difﬁculties, existing ones may. Thus,
most laboratories and consortia should seek a vendor who offers
a close match to conventional UNIX, Linux, or Windows servers.
 Cloud unfamiliarity and immaturity: Virtualized data centers,
including clouds, require additional skills to maintain security.
For example, when virtualizing existing servers, one must not
deploy sensitive data on the same virtual machine as widely-
accessible data [44]. The products are immature, have experi-
enced outages, and lack some desirable capabilities (e.g., as of
mid-2008, Amazon’s S3 product does not support ﬁrewall con-
ﬁguration based on IP address). However, cloud offerings are
improving rapidly; for example, GoGrid claims very high reli-
ability [34]. One will need to identify one’s needs and evaluate
vendors’ track records.
Clouds simplify some management tasks (load projections and
capital budgeting) but do require some new management
practices: Transitioning to a cloud will change the ways in which biomedical
systems are built, managed, and funded: This change may require
that project or consortium PIs expand their skills in contracting
effectively, including service-level guarantees and Help facilities
for developers.
 The models used for costing computational acquisitions need to be
changed, to better reﬂect true costs: When doing cost compari-
sons, PIs will need to assess the cost of hosting a system in a
cloud, and also to expand conventional systems’ cost analysis
to include oft-omitted costs such as systems administration
and facilities (space, electric power, and cooling equipment).
Institution-level accounting will also need to change, to account
for facilities costs. However, the move to clouds need not await
all these developments—in many settings, the cost beneﬁts are
sufﬁcient that even a rough analysis will point toward clouds.
8. Conclusion
We introduced cloud architectures for biomedical informati-
cists who may wish to build applications using a cloud, and for
investigators who want to share data with collaborators. The pre-
vious sections demonstrated that hosting on clouds sometimes
offers large ﬁnancial beneﬁts, signiﬁcant ﬂexibility and ease-of-
administration beneﬁts, and comparable security.
While not deﬁnitive, the case seems strong enough to justify
management attention from consortium leads, laboratory direc-
tors, and university CIOs. It seems desirable to begin funding pilot
efforts in which organizations examine the most current cloud
offerings. Decision criteria need to go beyond straightforward dol-
lar costs, to include risk reduction (e.g., of data loss or service
unavailability), increased ﬂexibility and scalability, and protection
of an institution’s other systems. We reiterate that the biomedical
organization retains the right to set and enforce its own sharing
policy.
Many observers believe that clouds represent the next genera-
tion of server computing. While one must be cautious with matur-
ing technologies, we expect that clouds will soon be suitable for
many biomedical research needs.
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